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Statement of the Case
1. Nature
is

!a

a

la

case.

magistrate's decision to the district court.

earl

This appeal is taken on District

Court Judge D. Duff McKee's order, entered and filed February 10, 2015,
dismissing the appeal from magistrate's division on the ground it was not
timely filed.
2. Course of Proceedings
Gordon Thomas Lanham died on December 5, 2013.

Decedent had

executed a Last Will and Testament on January 19, 2011. (R.p.10). Decedent
intended to disinherit Appellant and his brother.

He specifically gifted them

each $1.00 and a bed made for them by their grandfather. (R.p. 10-11).
A Petition for Informal Probate was filed on December 20, 2013.
(R.p.6) On January 8, 2014, Appellant, Thomas Everett Lanham, a son, filed
pro se an "Application to Attest Personal Representative." (R.p.2, Registry of
Actions, hereinafter ROA, Motion to Augment filed September 25, 20151,
Application to Attest Personal Representative, filed January 8, 2014).

On

January 13, 2014, Keith Lanham, by and through his attorney William F. Lee,

filed a Petition to Remove Personal Representative with claims contesting
validity of the will and seeking removal of the personal representative.
(R.pp.19-20). Both matters, Appellant's prose application and Keith Lanham's

1

Hereafter referred to as Motion to Augment.

1

petition, were set for hearing on January 21, 2014.
On January 21, 2014, Appellant, appeared; pro se.

Keith Lanham

appeared with his attorney, William F. Lee. The personal representative was
also present with his attorney. The Court continued both matters for a half

day court trial on April 2, 2014.

Judge Smith signed an ORDER SETTING

HEARING TO A DATE CERTAIN providing notice of the April 2, 2014 trial. This

order was delivered, to Appellant, to William F. Lee, attorney and to Nancy
Callahan.

(Motion to Augment, Order Setting Hearing to a Date Certain, file

stamped January 21, 2014 and Clerk's Minutes, dated January 21, 2014). 2
Appellant retained Attorney Fleenor on February 10, 2014. (R.p.42).
Attorney Fleenor entered an appearance in this case on behalf of Appellant by
filing a Petition for Order Removing Personal Representative, Construing Will
and Determining Heirs (R.pp. 23-25) and a Petition of Order Restraining
Personal Representative on March 24, 2014. (ROA p. 3) These Petitions were
noticed for hearing by Mr. Fleenor for April 3, 2014. 3
On March 28, 2014, the personal representative filed an affidavit with an
attached audio recording of the decedent. On March 31, 2014, William F. Lee,
on behalf of Keith Lanham, withdrew his Petition to Remove Personal
Representative and Keith's contest of the validity of the will. (ROA, R.p. 3).
On April 2, 2014, the personal representative appeared with witnesses

2

Appellant incorrectly states in his Statement of the Case that Mr. Lee was tasked with providing notice, notice of
hearing was not filed with the court, and "Thomas Lanham never received notice of the hearing." (Appellant's Brief
p. 1)
3 The Notice of Hearing and certificate of service provides only a 10 day notice.

2

prepared for trial. Appeilant and his attorney failed to appear.
On April 3, 2014, Appellant appeared wlth Mr. Fleenor for hearing on his
Petition for Order Removing Personal Representative, Construing Will and
Determining

Heirs

Representative.

and

his

Petition

for

Order

Restraining

Persona!

The personal representative and witnesses again appeared

prepared for trial. Appellant did not have evidence to present, just argument.
The Court reviewed the record and arguments of counsel and denied
Appellant's petitions. The Court instructed Attorney Fleenor that if Appellant
wanted to challenge the will he could file a petition and set it for a pretrial date
with the clerk. (Motion to Augment, Clerk's Minutes, dated April 3, 2014).
On April 8, 2014 Respondent filed a Motion, Affidavit, and Memorandum
for attorney's fees. (R.p. 26).

On April 11, 2014, Appellant filed his objection.

(R.p. 41). The matter of fees was not noticed for hearing at that time.
As noted above, after the April 2 and 3rd 2014 hearings, there was no
other petition pending before the magistrate.
were denied April 3, 2014.

The petitions Appellant filed

. Contrary to the Magistrate's instructions to

Appellant and his attorney on April 3, 2015 to file a petition to contest the
will and set the matter for a pretrial hearing, Appellant instead filed a Motion
for

Summary

Judgment

as

a

"Petitioner."

(R.p.

49)

Appellant's

memorandum claimed that "Petitioner" was seeking summary judgment
because the will was invalid as a matter of law. (R.pp.47-48).

3

The Respondent filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim with supporting affidavits.
(R.p.53-77). Appeli2nt did not file any objections, a repiy or in any way
respond to either of the Respondenfs motions.
On June 10, 2014 a hearing was held. The Court announced from
the bench that he would grant Respondent's motions and he denied
Appellant's motion. On June 20, 2014 Attorney Fleenor filed a document
purported to be a Motion for Reconsideration. (ROA p. 4). Appellant did
not file a notice of hearing with his Motion for Reconsideration or in any
other way indicate he wanted a hearing or oral argument in the motion.
The Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
the Judgment on June 25, 2014. (R.pp.79-84).

After entry of the

judgment Appellant did not request oral argument or file a notice of
hearing on his Motion for Reconsideration within 14 days after the entry
of the judgment or at any time.
On July 9, 2014, Respondent filed a Motion Affidavit and Memorandum
for attorney's fees and Appellant filed his objection on July 31, 2014. 4 (R.pp.
87, 105, 114)

The matter was not noticed for hearing by either party at that

time.

4

Appellant's objection to attorney's fees was filed 8 days late.

4

On August 13, 2014, 49 days after the entry of the judgment on
June 25, 2014, Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal from the Magistrate's
Division to the District Cour~. (R.pp. 112-13).
Appellant changed attorneys on November 13, 2014. (ROA, R.p. 4)
Appellant's new attorneys commenced briefing on Appellant's appeal and
submitted Appellant's brief on November 26, 2015. 5

(R.p. 118-33).

Appellant's brief did not mention the Motion for Reconsideration as an
issue and it did not address the timeliness of the appeal.
During the course of research and responding to Appellant's brief,
Respondent's counsel discovered that the Notice of Appeal was not filed
within 42 days of the judgment. A Motion to Dismiss Appeal was filed on
January 14, 2015. (R.pp. 134-40).

Appellant filed his Response to

Motion

142-46).

to

Dismiss Appeal.

(R.pp.

Respondent filed

a

Respondent's Reply to Appellant's response. (R.pp. 147-56). The District
Court entered its Order Dismissing Appellant's Appeal on February 10,

2015. (R.p. 157-60).
The

Magistrate

Court

entered

a

Memorandum

Decision

on

Attorneys fee on February 19, 2014 awarding Respondent attorney's fees
in the earlier proceedings.

Appellant appealed this decision and that

appeal is pending before the District Court.

5

Appellant's appeal brief filed in the district court is included in the Clerk's Record. (R.pp.118-33).

5

On March 23, 2015, Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal from
the District Court's Order Dismissing Appeal to this Court. (R.p.185-87)

RESPONDENT'S RESTATEMENT Of THE ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether Appellant timely filed his Notice of Appeal when
judgment was entered on June 25, 2014 and the Notice of Appeal
was filed 49 days later on August 13, 2014.
A. Whether due to a defect in the form of the judgment,
the judgment appealed from is not a final judgment.
B. Whether Appellant's time for filing his notice of appeal
was tolled because Appellant filed a motion for
reconsideration.
2. Whether Respondent is entitled to Attorneys Fees on this
appeal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54, Idaho Code §12-121, §12-123,
I.R.C.P 11, I.A.R. 11.2 and IDAHO CODE §15-8-208.

ARGUMENT
Standard of Review

This Court directly reviews the decision of the district court acting
in its appellate capacity. Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 303 P.3d 214
(2013).

This Court will either affirm or reverse the district's court

decision.

Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 284 P.3d 970 (2012).

The

district court held the appeal from magistrate division was not timely
filed and dismissed that appeal.

The Court freely reviews questions of

law. Whether an appeal to district court was timely filed is a question of
law.

Goodman Oil v Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., 147 Idaho 56

6

(2009).

The interpretation of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is a

uestion of law,

and

the Court exercises free

review over their

interpretation. Athay v Rich County, 153 Idaho 815,823 (2012). Where
the ordinary meaning of a rule is susceptible to multiple interpretations,
extrinsic evidence and the rules of statutory construction are used to
determine the correct interpretation. Boswell v Steele, _
348 P.3d 497 (2015)

Idaho _, --

Interpretations that lead to absurd results are

disfavored. Id. at 506.
Appellant advances two main contentions concerning the timeliness
of his appeal from magistrate division to district court:

(A) Because of

defects in form, the judgment appealed from is not a final judgment; (B)
The time for filing Appellant's notice of appeal was tolled because he filed
a motion for reconsideration on June 20, 2014.
A. Supposed defects in form of the judgment.

Appellant argues that the judgment filed June 25, 2014 is not a final
judgment. pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(a) because of defects and noncompliance
with I.R.C.P. 54(a). (App.Br. p.3).

Appellant seems to argue that the June

25, 2014 judgment is an interlocutory judgment, not a final judgment.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 3).
Appellant argues the June 25 judgment is not final because it does not
comply with Rule 54(a). Appellant complains the judgment omits the phrase
"JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS" and contains a recital of the

7

pleadings. Appellant cites LR.C.P. 54(a) and Cook v Arias, 2015 Lexis at 45 (Idaho 2015).
Appellant failed to raise this argument concerning the form of the
judgment in magistrate court or in district court.

In district court the

Appellant failed to raise this argument in Appellant's brief or in its response
to Respondent's motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely. Appellant should
not be allowed to raise the issue for the first time before this Court. This
Court will not address issues not preserved for appeal. See, State v Fodge,
121 Idaho at 195, 824 P.2d at 126 (generally, issues not raised below may
not be considered for the first time on appeal); State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho
267, 275, 77 P.3d 956, 964 (2003)(where a party appeals the decision of an
intermediate appellate court, the appellant may not raise issues that are
different from those presented to the intermediate court).
Considered on the merits the Appellant's argument about the form of
judgment fails. The language of I.C.R.P. 54(a) requiring judgments to begin
with the words "JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: ... " was added by an
amendment effective July 1, 2014. That requirement of Rule 54(a) was not
in effect when Magistrate Judge Tyler Smith entered the judgment in this
case June 25, 2014. Failure to include that language is a not a defect.
The judgment does include some procedural history, in arguable
violation of Rule 54(a). Respondent submits that the terse recitation of prior
proceedings in the judgment does not mean it is not a valid final judgment.

8

Whether the small 1 truncated procedural history contained in the
judgment invalidates the judgment, need not be decided.

The Idaho

Supreme Court, on February 12, 2015, through Chief Justice Roger S.
Burdick, entered Supreme Court Order, "In Re: Finality of Judgments
Entered Prior to April 151 2015." The Court ordered that "any judgment,

decree or order entered before April 15, 2015, that was intended to be final
but which did not comply with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a) or Idaho
Rule of Family Procedure 803 shall be treated as a final judgment."
The Magistrate's judgment entered on June 25, 2014 was intended to
be a final judgment. The judgment disposed of all claims of the parties. The
magistrate intended the judgment to be final. The parties all understood the
judgment to be an appealable final judgment.

Nothing in the record

suggests the parties or the Magistrate anticipated any further proceedings in
magistrate court, other than settling costs and attorney fees. Appellant does
not seem to acknowledge that if his complaint about the form of the
judgment is correct, and no final judgment was entered, then his appeal
proceedings in district court and in this court have all been for naught.
By the totality of the text of I.R.C.P. 54(a) and the authority of the
Supreme Court Order of February 12, 2015, quoted on the previous page,
the judgment is a valid final judgment.

B. Appellant failed to provide notice of hearing at the time he
filed his motion for reconsideration or at any time after entry of
judgment.

9

Appellant argues because he filed a motion for reconsideration the
time for filing appeal is tolled indefinitely (Appellant's Brief, p. 8). Appellant
claims that his Notice of Appeal from magistrate's division, fl!ed 49 days
after judgment was

filed,

was timeiy

even

though

the

motion

for

reconsideration was filed after hearing and before entry of judgment.
(Appeliant's brief 4-8).
Appellant goes to great lengths to argue that his Motion for
Reconsideration was timely filed and tolled the time for filing his appeal.
What Appellant fails to address is that even if his motion for reconsideration
was timely it was never brought before the court for hearing. I.R.C.P. 7(b). 7
This rule requires that a notice of hearing accompany the motion or the
motion be contained within a notice of hearing, unless the motion is made ex
parte.
desired.

It is the litigant's duty to secure a hearing on a motion if one is
I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l) dictates that a proper motion (other than one

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 7(b)(l). Motions and Other Papers.
An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be
made in writing, shall state with particularity the grounds therefor including the number of the applicable civil rule,
if any, under which it is filed, and shall set forth the relief or order sought. A proposed form of order, if included,
shall be a separate document. The requirement of writing is fulfilled if the motion is stated in a written notice of
the hearing of the motion.
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 7(b)(3). Time Limits for Filing and Serving Motions, Affidavits and Briefs.
Unless otherwise ordered by the court, which order may for cause shown be made on ex parte application, or
specified elsewhere in these rules:
(A) A written motion, other than one which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereon shall be
filed with the court, and served so that it is received by the parties no later than fourteen (14) days before the time
specified for the hearing.
7

***
(D) If the moving party does not request oral argument upon the motion, and does not file a brief within fourteen
(14) days, the court may deny such motion without notice if the court deems the motion has no merit. If argument
has been requested on any motion, the court may, in its discretion, deny oral argument by counsel by written or
oral notice to all counsel before the day of the hearing, and the court may limit oral argument at any time.

10

made exparte or at trial) shall be in writing, state with particularly the
grounds for the motion and includes the number of any applicable civil rule
under which it is filed. The requirement of a written motion can be fulfllied if
the motion is stated in a notice of hearing.
I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(A) requires that "[a] written motion, other than one
which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereon shall
be filed with the court, and served so that it is received by the parties no

later than fourteen (14) days before the time specified for the hearing."
(Emphasis added)
Appellant's purported Motion for Reconsideration at the heart of their
argument was never properly filed or brought before the magistrate because
the form of the motion a) was not within a notice of hearing; b) Appellant
did not file a notice of hearing at the time he filed the purported Motion for
Reconsideration; and c) Appellant did not file a notice of hearing at any time
after the entry of the magistrate's findings of facts and conclusions of law
and judgment.
C. Appellant's motion for reconsideration was not a valid post
judgment motion and did not suspend the time for filing his notice of
appeal indefinitely.

Appellant argues that an appeal must be filed within 42 days of a
judgment and that "the running of the time for appeal from a final judgment
is suspended by ... a timely motion to amend or make additional findings of

11

fact or conclusions of law, whether or not an alteration of the judgment is
required if the motion is granted." (App.Br.p.3-6)
In this case, there was no post-judgment motion even if it ls
considered a premature post trial judgment.

Appellant attempts to get

around this by arguing that Appellant's motion for reconsideration was really
a post-judgment motion to amend the finding of fact and conclusion of law
before the findings of fact and conclusions of law existed.
Appeals from the Magistrate's Division to the District Court are
governed by I.R.C.P. 83(e) I.R.C.P. 83(e)(l)-(4) prescribes the types of
motions that suspend or toll the time for filing an appeal.
Rule 83{e}. Filing appeal.

Except for the filing of an appeal from a small claim
judgment as provided in Rule 81(1), an appeal to a district court
from the magistrate's divisions must be filed with the
appropriate district court within 42 days after entry of the
judgment or order. Provided, however, that in the magistrate's
division the running of the time for appeal from a final judgment
is suspended by (1) a timely motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict following a timely motion for a
directed verdict, (2) a timely motion to amend or make
additional findings of fact or conclusions of law, whether or not
alteration of the judgment is required if the motion is granted,
(3) a timely motion to alter or amend the judgment (except
motions under Rule 60 or motions regarding costs and attorney
fees) or ( 4) a timely motion for new trial; and the full time for
appeal from such a final judgment commences to run and is to
be computed from the date of the clerk's filing stamp on any
order granting or denying any of the above motions.

12

A timely filing of the motions described in (1) through (4) of I.R.C.P.
83(e), not only suspends running of time for appeal, it restarts the 42 d:-.: y
period running when the motion is granted or denied.
Of the four types of motions which suspend running of the time for
appeal, Rule 83(e)(1) through (4), Appellant relies only on the second type,
"a timely motion to amend or make additional findings of fact or conclusions
of law, whether or not alteration of the judgment is required if the motion is
granted." (App.Br.p.3-6)

Appellant argues his motion for reconsideration is

really a motion to amend or make additional findings of fact to fit the tolling
provisions of Rule 83(e)(2).

By relying on only 83(e)(2), Appellant waived

argument, or conceded the inapplicability of Rule 83(e)(l), (3), and (4). 9
Appellant seems to blame the magistrate for the absurd result that is
the inevitable conclusion of Appellant's analysis.

Appellant attempts to

support his argument that the motion for reconsideration tolled indefinitely
the time for filing an appeal with State v. Ferguson, 138 Idaho 659 (Ct. App.
2002); Ade

v. Batten, 126 Idaho 114 (Ct. App. 1994), and State V.

Wolfe,_ Idaho_, 343 P.3d 497, (Idaho 2015). Respondent is unable to
see how Ade, Ferguson or Wolfe helps Appellant.

Not one of these cases

Respondent agrees that I.R.C.P. 83(e)(1),{3),and (4) cannot possibly be applied to Appellant's motion for
reconsideration. The first type, (1), is 11 a timely motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict following a
timely motion for a directed verdict." There was no trial or verdict. The third type of motion, (3), is 11 a timely
motion to alter or amend the judgment (except motions under Rule 60 or motions regarding costs and attorney
fees)." Because no judgment was entered at the time Appellant filed the motion for reconsideration, Appellant's
motion cannot be of the type described in (3). The fourth type of motion, (4), is 11 a timely motion for new trial."
Since there was no trial, appellant's motion for reconsideration cannot be of the type described in (4).
9

13

holds that a motion for reconsideration which is never noticed for hearing
or otherwise hec>rd and decided tolls the time for filing an appeal. Not one of
these cases suggests that Appellant's motion for reconsideration is the type
of motion I.R.C.P. 83(e){2) describes such that it will suspend running of the
time for filing the notice of appeal. In fact in Wolfe, the Supreme Court said
that when a district court fails to rule on a motion, the Supreme Court
presumes the district court denied the motion. Id. at 503-04.
Based on Wolfe, Id. the magistrate denied Appellant's motion for
reconsideration when he entered the findings of fact and conclusions of law
and judgment.
D. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

In Appellant's arguments about the form of judgment, Appellant (1)
cited a version of I.R.C.P. that was not in effect at the time of judgment, and
(2) failed to cite the Supreme Court Order of February 12, 2015, that
disposed of his other argument concerning the judgment. This, in addition
to raising the arguments the first time on appeal, is frivolous conduct.
Appellant's arguments concerning the motion for consideration making
the notice of appeal timely are based on totally ignoring a litigant's duty to
notice a motion for hearing, I.R.C.P. 7.

Appellant's argument that because

that motion was never formally decided, the time for appeal was indefinitely
tolled is based on interpretations of the civil rules that are absurd. This is
frivolous conduct.

14

For the reasons set forth above Respondent argues that Appellant's
appeal of the District Court's Order Dismissing Appeal is neither novel nor
persuasive.

Respondent SL!bmits that Appellant's

arguments against

dismissal are wholly without basis in fact or law and are frivolous.
Respondent requests an award of attorney's fees on this appeal pursuant to
Idaho Code §12-121, §12-123, I.R.C.P. 11, I.A.R. 11.2 and Idaho Code §15-

8-208.
CONCLUSION

Appellant's notice of appeal filed 49 days after the entry of judgment
was not timely.

The motion for reconsideration filed in this case had no

effect on the time for filing the notice of appeal.

Appellant's arguments

against dismissal are wholly without basis in fact or law and are frivolous.
This Court ought to affirm the District Court's decision dismissing this appeal
from Magistrate's Court.
-

v

Dated this.;LS-day of September, 2015.

I

,

Nancyµ: Callahan
Attorneys for Respondent

15
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